The International Institute for Middle-East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) in Ljubljana, Slovenia, regularly analyses events in the Middle East and the Balkans. Dr. Jožef Kunič, former Slovenian ambassador to Iran, President of the Slovenian Association for International Relations (SDMO) and member of the IFIMES International Institute, in his article "Iran – the International Community at the Crossroads" analyses the current situation in Iran, laying stress on the pressing "nuclear crisis". His article is published in full.

Iran – the International Community at the Crossroads

It hasn't been long since the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran solemnly declared that their experts managed to produce the first volumes of enriched uranium which is pure enough to fuel nuclear power plants although far from the purity required for nuclear weapons. Despite the warnings of the international community, Iran does not show any intentions to give up the uranium enrichment programme arguing that it is a civil programme not intended for the weapon development. However, the western politicians do not believe those statements and perceive Iran's nuclear programme as a threat for the region and the Western world with global implications.

Does Iran really want nuclear weapons? There is no unanimous answer to that question. The experts on Iran's political scene know that this is not a state where the events and the decision-making in certain fields would be harmonised between all those who are active in those fields. Traditionally, the groups operating in one field are mostly independent from each other, not co-ordinated with other groups and often have completely opposing goals. Perhaps it is true that Iran's regular army does not want nuclear weapons, but that does not mean that the Revolutionary Guards (Pasdaran) do not want it either. Whether the above institutions want it or not, this does not have much influence on the religious leadership whose wish is often not harmonised with that of the government elected or chosen in the Iranian way. There is a strong likelihood that one of the above groups (or perhaps some other group) is determined to get the nuclear weapons. It is quite possible (although not very probable) that Iran's President Ahmadinejad seriously and sincerely believes that Iran should not use the nuclear programme for military purposes, but that does not mean at all that there is no such programme nor a firm intent to realise it in Iran. Iran's nuclear programme is not organised within any ministry (neither defence ministry nor energy or science ministries). It is an independent, autonomous institution which is only formally dependant on the president of the state in terms of its organisation, although it is clear that other institutions have strong informal influence on it. Undoubtedly, it will be susceptible to the ideas of those who are ready to give it most funds and power, and they are the ones who want the nuclear weapons.

The question is how dangerous Iran would be in military terms if it had nuclear weapons. It is very likely that it would not use nuclear weapons in a military action. Although some are convinced that Iran has chemical and biological weapons, which are also very dangerous, that fact is by far not as worrying as eventual development of nuclear weapons. If Iran uses the nuclear weapons it will most probably suffer a retaliatory nuclear attack which will be disastrous for the ruling elite. Some people wonder whether Iran would use nuclear weapons against Israel. The probability of this kind of attack is very small. Israel is much more powerful and presumably also much more efficient than Iran in military terms. Moreover, we should not forget that Iran's regime, like any totalitarian regime, needs an enemy, and Israel is a very appropriate enemy for the rhetorical usage in Iran's domestic politics. It is hard to believe that the leading Iran's elite would really want to lose that argument for achieving "unity", "obedience" and "readiness" of the nation.

Although the military use of nuclear weapons by Iran is not to be expected, the mere fact that Iran has those weapons and that it is able to produce them represents a great danger. Perhaps this danger would be smaller if Iran's nuclear programme had not stirred up so much opposition in the Western world. Nevertheless, if the nuclear programme is successfully concluded, although perhaps mainly for civil purposes, this will be a glorious victory for Iran which will be perceived by the extremists and fundamentalists outside Iran as the general victory against the West. This would be a great impetus for further anti-western activities and an encouragement to all those who would like to replace the non-democratic pro-western regimes in the Arab world, especially in oil-rich regions. The stability of the western economy would be jeopardised since it largely depends on oil which would, due to the unstable situation in this part of the world, become a scarce and much more expensive raw material. In that case the probability of economic instability would be very strong.

The present situation in the region of Iran is very worrying. The stability and democracy is far from being established in Afghanistan, the situation in Iraq is anything but normal, and Iran has been confronting - successfully so far - the international community. Many - especially the sympathisers with the Islamic extremists - believe that the international community is powerless, scared and lost in this part of the world. This is a great encouragement for all those extremists who are ready to use radical means to oppose the globalisation process. Iran is in a diplomatic war against the West. Iran's "victory" (i.e. the unpunished continuation of the uranium enrichment programme) would encourage the extremists as well as the Islamic fundamentalist movements in Europe and elsewhere in the prevailingly Christian Western world. This situation would obviously aggravate Israel's security, although not directly by Iran but through encouraging the extremists and the fundamentalists.

The economic instability which would most probably be directly supported or even caused by Iran's gaining of nuclear weapons, would not be limited only to the USA. The USA would not be the first state to suffer instability. The first in the row would probably be Japan and Europe. This would lead to wider instability which would be subsequently strongly felt by the USA. Even Russia and China would not be excluded from this process. It is therefore understandable that the EU and the USA are both so eager to stop Iran's nuclear programme. Obviously Russia and China are eager to do that too, but have too many interests in Iran to express any serious warning and will most probably not react very strongly if the USA and the EU take a more serious approach to this problem.

The USA still have serious problems in Iraq, so they initially left the diplomatic initiative to resolve the Iranian issue to the European Union. However, the EU offered some solutions which lead to only two possible conclusions: either that the EU is not able to offer Iran any acceptable solution and to asses how Iran feels about the offered solutions, or that it intentionally offers Iran unacceptable solutions and thus de facto leaves the problem to be resolved by the USA, which clearly has the competence and determination to resolve it in a diplomatic way, or, if diplomacy fails, to use other means in order to resolve the problem.

The European troika (France, Great Britain, Germany) first offered some trade concessions which were, with the rocketing oil prices, of no significant importance to Iran, and their economic effect would according to some estimations not even nearly compensate for the funds which Iran has invested in the nuclear programme during the past fifteen years. Iran of course rejected the offer, as any average analyst could have predicted with a great deal of certainty. It was even more bizarre when the EU offered a new nuclear power plant to Iran. It was clear to any average connoisseur of Iran that this offer was unacceptable for Iran. The construction of the Busher nuclear power plant was started by the German KWU (i.e. by the EU). Due to the revolution and the Iraq-Iran War the works were suspended and according to Iran's claims the paid equipment was not delivered nor was the money repaid. Iran is convinced that the subsequent bombing of the Busher plant was performed by the EU aircraft and pilots (although they carried Iraq's marks). After the war ended, according to Iran's statements, KWU was not ready to continue the construction, due to which Iran incurred immense costs in order to make adjustments for the installation of the Russian equipment. And after all this Iran should accept another reactor from the EU?

The interest of the developed Western states is clear although a different picture is presented to the general public. There should be no global economic crisis since that would have negative implications practically for the whole world. Perhaps only some non-democratic dictatorship regimes would profit from such crisis as they are anyway in a poor economic situation and would only celebrate the fact that others are doing bad, too. Iran's nuclear programme should therefore be stopped. It was easy to come to this conclusion, but the problem is "How?". President Ahmadinejad has already gone very far in his rhetoric and it will be difficult for him to withdraw to a more sensible attitude. The US President has also gone relatively far in his rhetoric and for him, too, will be difficult to retreat to the border of compromise. The USA determinedly insist (with somewhat less determined support from others) that Iran should stop uranium enrichment. Iran has stated several times very decisively and loudly that it is under no conditions ready to stop uranium enrichment. Both sides hope that time will do its work and that they can benefit from negotiations, presentations of ideas, programmes etc. The USA believe that if together with the EU, Russia and China they use the carrot and stick strategy Iran will eventually, after long talks, agree to stop uranium enrichment. But Iran demands a huge carrot, since with the present crude oil prices and increased gas demands it is not facing economic difficulties, but the failure to fulfil the national pride and the promises would wash away Ahmadinejad together with his followers. Although by constantly accepting negotiations Iran is seemingly gaining time, the fact is that the compromise can only be achieved if one side makes sweeping concessions - but those concessions would have to be so profound that the political survival of those making them would be endangered. This leaves no space for a compromise solution: Iran either continues uranium enrichment or not. There is no middle road. The USA and others either accept that Iran continues those activities or not. There is no middle road here either. The status quo remains: The USA (and the large part of the international community) uncompromisingly insist that Iran stop the nuclear programme (in its territory) while Iran uncompromisingly insists on continuing the nuclear programme. Both sides have gone so far in their political acts and rhetorics that it is impossible for them to return without suffering devastating political damage.

Unless there is a complete turnabout, which is very unlikely, the Western states will have to take some action. If they fail to succeed that the Iranians themselves overthrow Iran's regime, which is very unlikely with the Iranians and especially the Persians feeling endangered and with Israel as the official enemy, there is a real possibility for a military intervention. There are some arguments against and in favour of such intervention.

In comparison with Iraq the intervention in Iran would be much more difficult: the state is much bigger with a more complicated geographical configuration, has three times more inhabitants who are traditionally much more zealous warriors, especially when defending their fatherland. Military strategists would have to examine carefully those facts. Another threat is the blockade of transportation of crude oil through the Strait of Hormuz where all the crude oil not transported through pipelines passes from Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Iran. This would lead the world into a devastating economic crisis with unimagined consequences. Iran's supreme religious leader Khamenei threatened not only to stop supplying Iran's oil, which the world might be able to deal with somehow, but even to block oil supplies from the whole region.

If the military action managed to prevent Iran's blockade of Hormuz the major crisis could be avoided, but the prices of crude oil would still increase. In that case the economies of Europe (except Great Britain and Norway), Japan and China would suffer most, while the price increase would not directly affect the United States, which have plenty of capital in world oil companies (and American dollar is the means of payment for oil), nor the crude oil exporting states. It should be kept in mind that it would be very difficult to prevent the blockade and that it would be very risky to forecast a successful operation.

Another problem would be the situation in Iran after the eventual attack. It may soon turn into chaos and internal conflicts as was the case in Iraq. While ethnic conflicts would be less probable, there is a greater possibility for the ideological conflicts between the advocators of the present regime and their opposers. However, it is the cruel reality that although there is a chaotic situation in Iraq the state has no influence over the rest of the world. The same would hold true of Iran: it would be chaotic but without any broader international influence. Nevertheless, the chaotic situation could affect the region (Iraq, Afghanistan) and the terrorism, which would definitely jeopardise safe transportation of oil through the Strait of Hormuz. Insecure oil transportation through the chaotic region would lead to aggravation of the global economic situation, which the Western world surely does not want.

There is another factor that should be stressed: namely the international reputation of those taking part in the eventual military action, especially of the USA, would be compromised due to innocent victims and questionable legitimacy of such action. Not to mention the long-term negative consequences this would have for them.

The international community is therefore at the crossroads. To react or not to react military? Iran and the Western states are merely gaining time by prolonging the talks and offering new ideas and proposals which essentially only change the power of threats and the size of offered benefits without any elementary new ideas.

But the West is still at the crossroads where both roads offer very bad options:

- If the West intervenes militarily in Iran, this will be a very bad option. There would be a major oil crisis the size of which would depend on the success of the military intervention. If the intervention is successful it will be clear to the Islamic fundamentalists that the West will not tolerate their activities, which is the positive element of this alternative.

-If Iran wins in this dispute, this will be very bad for the West. It would encourage the Islamic terrorists and fundamentalists, which would represent a long-term threat to the stability of the world economy.

In the short-term it seems that the loss suffered by the West would be smaller if military means are used to prevent Iran from producing nuclear weapons.

Unfortunately, there is no good way out of this crisis and whatever solution to the problem is chosen it will be bad for the whole world. It seems that the world is entering a crisis of global dimensions and we can only hope that this is only seemingly so.

Ljubljana, June 21, 2006

International Institute form Middle-East
and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) – Ljubljana

Directors:
Zijad Becirovic, M.Sc.
Bakhtyar Aljaf